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Abstract 
Research on gender equality policy has generally focused on actors and institutions at the national 
and international levels.  This paper considers the role of local level actors and institutions in 
explaining different policy responses to violence against women and girls (VAWG).  The literature on 
gender policy trajectories identifies the particular importance of executive actors in influencing 
‘status policies’ like VAWG.  Quantitative data is analyzed to show how local Police and Crime 
Commissioners in England and Wales have responded to demands for policy action.  The focus is on 
the interaction between the 41 elected commissioners and the new institutional arrangements for 
police governance introduced in 2012.  The paper shows that variation in policy outcomes is related 
(a) to the gender of executive actors, and (b) to the way in which actors interpret elements of the 
institutional framework, regardless of their own gender. 
  
 Introduction 
Research on politics and gender has examined the determinants of policy change to achieve gender 
equality (Lovenduski, 2005; Mazur and Pollack, 2009; Gains and Lowndes, 2014).  The focus has been 
on the role of women's movements in provoking change (Weldon, 2002; Montaya, 2009; Abrar, 
1996; Htun and Weldon, 2012), alongside female representatives, executive actors and ‘femocrats’ 
(Annesley et al, 2015; Banaszak, 2010; Holli, 2008).  More recently, feminist institutionalism has 
argued for the need to appreciate the way in which institutions, understood to be rules-in-use, 
structure advocacy and processes of policy reform across a range of venues.  It is argued that a focus 
on both actors and institutions, and the way in which actors operate in rule bound settings, can 
elucidate the dynamics of  gender equality policy reform (Krook and Mackay, 2011; Mackay, Kenny 
and Chappell, 2010; Waylen, 2014; Raymond et al, 2014).   
Drawing on insights from public policy scholarship, research has also underlined the heterodoxy of 
policy change for different types of gender equality reform, pointing to a distinction between ‘class 
based’ and ‘status based’ policies (Htun and Weldon, 2010).  The presence of critical actors in 
executive positions has been found to be especially important in getting status based issues, like 
violence against women and girls (VAWG), on government agendas (Annesley et al, 2015).  This 
article nvestigates further the determinants of policy change.  It argues that, as well as recognizing 
heterodoxy in policy type, it is also necessary to analyze where critical actors with executive 
authority are located within multi-level institutional arrangements.  Existing scholarship on gender 
equality reforms has focused primarily on actors at the national and international levels, although 
there is work on states and provinces within federal systems (Chappell, 2002; Chappell and Curtin, 
2013; Haussman et al, 2010).  This still leaves a gap in our understanding of the role of executive 
actors at the level of municipal or local governance.  The article argues that such local-level 
executive actors play an important role in deciding whether or not to prioritize policies to tackle 
VAWG, and seeks to explain this variation.  By focusing on local actors and their interaction with 
local institutions, we can better understand the determinants of variation in gender policy 
outcomes.   
To examine the institutional shaping of gender equality policy at the local level, we investigate how 
local Police and Crime Commissioners in England and Wales have responded to demands for policy 
action to tackle VAWG emanating from both national government and local lobbying groups.  
Seeking to extend the analytical and methodological purchase of feminist institutionalism, we set 
out a framework to show the relationship between policy stimuli, gendered institutional rules and 
gendered actors in influencing gendered outcomes. We use this framework to examine the relative 
importance of equalities duties (rules) and the gender of Police and Crime Commissioners (actors) in 
getting VAWG onto local policy agendas.  Findings demonstrate that variability in policy outcomes 
(i.e. the prioritization of measures to tackle VAWG) is linked to actors’ own gender but also to the 
different ways in which actors engage with elements of the local institutional framework, notably 
gender equality duties.  In conclusion, we argue for an appreciation of the way in which institutional 
arrangements at the local level, and their interpretation by local decision makers, can shape gender 
equality policy reform. Cross-nationally, governance structures may accord more or less decision 
making authority to local actors in respect of gender equality, but researchers need to establish 
where it is that the relevant critical actors sit within multi-level systems for specific categories of 
policy.  Our findings in respect of local police governance in England and Wales provide a reference 
point for further research on the local level framing of status based gender equality reforms, while 
also showing how key variables can be operationalized and measured. 
Actors and Institutions in Gender Equality Policy Reform 
Research on the determinants of policy change to achieve gender equality has focused on a number 
of key issues: the transmission of ideas for reform through international norms and agreements 
(Raymond, Weldon et al 2014; Friedman, 2013); the link between improved female political 
representation and substantive policy action (Celis et al, 2008; Annesley and Gains, 2010; Atchison 
and Down, 2009;) and the role of ‘femocrats’ (working in women’s policy agencies and other 
bureaucratic settings) in supporting reform inside government (Stetson and Mazur, 1995; Sawyer, 
2003; Banaszak, 2010; Andrews and Miller, 2013).  Scholarship has foregrounded the role, in 
particular policy venues, of civil society actors, political representatives and bureaucratic actors – 
what Ortbals et al (2013) call the ‘triangle of empowerment’.   
Feminist institutionalism has sought to generate theoretical propositions that can be applied and 
explored across specific cases.  Where March and Olsen (1984) argued that ‘the organization of 
political life makes a difference’, feminist institutionalists hold that the gendered organization of 
political life matters.  Institutions, understood as the formal and informal ‘rules of the game’, 
structure the allocation of roles and resources, and convey embedded norms and rules about the 
possibilities for political action.  Feminist scholarship has drawn attention to the way in which these 
institutional arrangements are gendered (Krook and Mackay, 2011; Waylen, 2011; Chappell and 
Waylen, 2013; Gains and Lowndes, 2014).  Jill Vickers (2013, 1) draws attention to the two-way 
nature of this relationship, arguing that ‘gender makes the state’ (through the influence of societal 
norms and power relationships) whilst ‘the state makes gender’ (through the reproduction, 
amplification even, of these norms through state programs and policies).  The relationship between 
gendered organization and gendered outcomes is an iterative one, with outcomes shaping 
expectations about organization, as well as vice versa.  Building on earlier feminist scholarship that 
examined the role of gender in political organizations (Lovenduski, 1998; Acker, 1990; Beckwith, 
1992), feminist institutionalism draws attention to the difficulty of changing gendered institutional 
rules, the conditions under which change might occur, and strategies for embedding new norms and 
rules.  McBride and Mazur (2010) distinguish between the gendered nature of policy processes (the 
level of inclusion of equality advocates) and of policy contents (the relative success of feminist 
framing of problems).   Gendered outcomes, such as an increase in policies encouraging female 
representation, can also be seen as determining variables for the progress of policy reform.  Gender 
therefore can be implicated as both a dependent and an independent variable in explaining 
processes of institutional reform.  Responding to this challenge, Gains and Lowndes (2014) argue 
that research should distinguish between four different dimensions, whilst also analyzing their 
interaction: rules about gender, rules with gendered effects, gendered actors working with rules, 
and gendered policy outcomes.   The challenge is to identify, and measure, the micro-foundations 
upon which the gendered character of political institutions is built. 
Another strand of gender and policy scholarship draws attention to the heterogeneity of gender 
equality policies and the associated reform processes (Mazur, 2002).  Policies designed to achieve 
gender equality encompass a range of policy types.  Some policies are aimed at supporting women in 
the workplace, such as childcare and maternity benefits, and policies ensuring equal rights in terms 
of pay and pension entitlements.  These are termed ‘class policies’ by Htun and Weldon (2010), who 
see them as facilitating women’s economic integration (in the context of unpaid work in the home), 
aiming to ensure that all women, not just rich women, are able to access and benefit from paid 
employment.  Other policy areas, however, directly address women’s bodily integrity, such as 
women’s health issues like breast cancer, abortion rights and reproductive rights.  Policies 
addressing bodily integrity also include those addressing violence against women in all its 
manifestations including domestic violence, trafficking and sexual harassment.  Htun and Weldon 
(2010) refer to these as ‘status policies’ because they address the subordinate status of women as a 
group.   
To understand better the different determinants of gender equality policies, Htun and Weldon’s 
class/status distinction (which builds upon the work of an earlier generation of comparative feminist 
scholars like Norris, 1987, and Yishai, 1993) can be combined with insights from the agenda setting 
literature (Baumgartner et al, 2006).  Research has examined the problem of when national 
governments ‘pay serious attention’ (Kindgon, 1984) to gender equality reforms in five European 
countries (Annesley et al, 2015).  Recognizing that gender equality reform is not a core issue on 
governmental agendas, the research investigates the conditions under which gender equality 
reaches critical decision agendas.  It is found that, for class based gender equality reform, the 
presence of strong left parties is important, for example in relation to extending rights already 
granted to male employees such as equal pay and pension rights. The presence of women in 
legislatures is linked is also linked to class based gender equality policies, including parental leave 
and childcare.  Status based gender equality policies, on the other hand, can provoke doctrinal 
resistance in some contexts as these types of policies may challenge deep-seated religious and 
cultural norms.  In these settings, feminist mobilization in civil society is found to account for 
variation in policy development (Htun and Weldon 2012). However, status based polices are also 
linked to both social democratic and liberal ideals; indeed, Chappell and Curtin (2013) find that 
policy change in this area can be led by right and left parties.  Getting status based issues, such as 
violence against women, on government decision agendas is, however, more likely when women are 
in executive roles, suggesting that the advocacy of critical actors is key for measures that may 
provoke doctrinal resistance (Annesley et al, 2015).  Thus existing research on the determinants of 
gender equality policy reforms focuses on the way in which gendered actors operate in different 
institutional settings to progress (or not) a heterogeneous set of policy issues.   
Whether looking at single gender equality policy or a range of policy areas, the vast majority of 
research has focused on the international or national level of analysis.  Addressing a gap in the 
literature, this article focuses on the local or municipal level of government, and argues that policy 
prioritization in favor of gender equality needs to be understood in the context of multi-level 
relationships. In relation to VAWG, both Roggeband’s (2016) Latin American research and work on 
East/Central Europe (Krizsan and Popa, 2014) challenge linear and mechanistic model of norm 
diffusion from the international to the national arena, showing the importance of multi-level and 
multi-directional relationships.  Below the level of the nation state, there is an emerging body of 
literature on federalism and meso-level government, which considers whether federal arrangements 
afford greater access to gender equality advocates, and more opportunities for policy innovation 
and learning, in comparison with unitary systems (Haussman et al, 2010; Vickers, 2013).  In the case 
of VAWG, Chappell and Curtin (2013) find limited support for this contention when comparing 
Australia and New Zealand.  Findings from their three country study lead Ortbals et al (2013) to 
counter any assumption that women have more of an ‘affinity’ with meso-level legislatures because 
they are ‘closer to home’.  Access relies as much at this level as any other upon the character of the 
relationship between activists, bureaucrats and political representatives.  As Chappell (2002) points 
out, there is a ‘conditional’ relationship between institutional, agential and contextual factors, with 
federal systems not necessarily being more conducive to gender reform.   
This article explores these conditional relationships at a lower level still, that of municipal or local or 
government, where little is known about the conditions under which gender equality policies are 
prioritized (or not).  The importance of research at the local level lies not just in getting a more 
complete picture of the multi-level institutional environment for gender equality reform.  Insights 
from public policy literature show that the broad intentions of policy makers at national level are 
generally interpreted and applied in different ways through local decision making processes 
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973).  Policy is only really ‘made’ when it is brought to life by local actors, 
who are charged with adapting overarching policy statements to local contexts, resource bases, 
political sensibilities, and previous policy legacies.   The ‘agential’ turn in institutionalist theory has 
argued that the way in which actors interpret institutional precepts is central to explaining how 
institutions change over time, reflecting the demands of changing contexts but also the strategic 
interests of individual or collective actors).  Our research does not look at implementation in the 
sense of the service or policy delivery; rather, it focuses on the determinants on policy prioritization 
at the local level.  As such, we take up Laurel Weldon’s (2002, 5, 20) plea that research on gender 
equality reform “should focus more attention on variation in the structure of public administration”, 
while exploring her specific contention that the study of “local government and sub-government is 
critical to the complete understanding of gender and public policy.”  We investigate the role of local 
executive actors, working with local governance institutions, in explaining why VAWG policies are 
prioritized in some localities and not in others, despite common policy frameworks operating at 
‘higher’ levels.  Such insights could potentially influence interventions to push VAWG up local policy 
agendas.  
To address the gaps in the literature and evidence base, we examine the institution of directly 
elected Police and Crime Commissioners in England and Wales, established in 2012.  These new 
actors are charged with putting into practice national legislation and policy agendas by developing 
strategies, services and monitoring arrangements for VAWG.  Considering an institution in formation 
allows us to investigate the proposition in the literature that institutional change opens up 
opportunities for gender equality reforms (Mackay, 2008, 130).  As Celis et al (2013, 46) ask, can 
progressive elements be ‘locked in’ at a time when structures and underpinning values are being 
negotiated?  It is possible that the directly elected Commissioners could over time become new 
critical actors in favor of gender equality, while their offices could also provide new arenas for 
femocrats and a new access point for women’s movement organizations.  The article investigates 
variation in PCCs’ gender equality policies (focusing on VAWG) and seeks to relate these to key 
institutional and agential variables.   
Police and Crime Commissioners in England and Wales 
Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) were first elected in November 2012 following the 
enactment of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2012.  Elections were held in 41 police 
force areas across England and Wales; these are metropolitan or sub-regional areas that cover more 
than one elected local government unit.  Police governance was previously the responsibility of 
nominated Police Committees made up of councilors from the constituent local authorities.  Directly 
elected Commissioners, however, are formally independent of elected local government.  PCCs are 
supported by a Deputy and small office, while local government councilors serve on scrutiny panels 
that review Commissioners’ policies and performance (Police and Crime Panels).  Panels are also 
able to co-opt members from the community and voluntary sectors, the magistracy and probation 
service.  The creation of a directly elected public official, overseeing the work of local policing, is not 
only new but also unusual in a UK political landscape that has no tradition of presidential or mayoral 
elections.  The new institutional arrangements were intended to increase the accountability of police 
governance by having a clearly identifiable individual office-holder, subject to direct election by the 
public on a four-year cycle.  The change was part of a more general commitment by the incoming 
2010 Coalition Government to encourage democratic engagement in local decision-making (Green, 
2012).  The model was inspired by the role played in various US cities (notably New York) by a single 
elected official “with clear responsibility for policing matters – someone who can be held 
accountable by the electorate for police performance” (Newburn, 2012, 40), but also differed from 
American models by according that responsibility to a police-specific elected official rather than a 
city mayor. 
While not able to interfere directly in operational policing decisions, Police and Crime 
Commissioners (PCCs) set the police and crime priorities for the area they serve (and are responsible 
for appointing, and dismissing, the operational head of police – the Chief Constable).  Policy 
priorities, published annually in a Police and Crime Plan, must reflect consultation with the public 
locally and also take account of the UK Home Secretary’s strategic policing requirements (issues 
deemed to have national significance).  To support the priorities identified in the Police and Crime 
Plan, PCCs can allocate funds for specific projects and also commission Crime and Disorder 
Partnerships (which include local councilors and the third sector) to provide ancillary services (e.g. 
research, good practice pilots, public consultations).  It is these new PCCs, therefore, who have 
executive decision-making authority in deciding which policies to prioritize (Lister and Rowe, 2015). 
Many of the new PCCs had served on the previous Police Committees or worked in the police force 
itself or in the criminal justice system, while others came from a social work or business background.  
The old Police Committees did not have the same agenda setting or resource allocation powers as 
the new PCCs or the legitimacy which flows from their separate electoral mandate.  New 
institutional rules govern the election and duties of the commissioners, their relationships with 
other criminal justice actors and the scrutiny of their work, but they are also influenced by the 
ongoing national oversight of the UK Home Secretary and the longstanding traditions of their local 
police forces and the elected local authorities with whom they have to work (on crime prevention, 
for instance). 
An examination of the PCC institution is highly relevant for an exploration of how the gendered 
organization of political life makes a difference.  First, policing is traditionally a very male 
environment (Westmarland, 2002); the great majority of actors with leadership roles in the police 
services are men (Tickle, 2012).  Indeed, of the first tranche of forty one PCCs elected in 2012, only 
six were women.  Second, the incidence, experience, reporting of and impact of crime is highly 
gendered with longstanding gender differences in rates of criminal engagement, victimhood and 
arrest (reflecting the international picture reported by UN Women, 2011).  Home Office statistics 
show that, in 2012, “1.2 million women suffered domestic abuse, over 400,000 women were 
sexually assaulted, 70,000 women were raped and thousands more were stalked” (Home Office, 
2013a). Men and boys can and do also suffer gendered violence, but most gendered violence 
involved male perpetrators and female victims (Home Office 2011: 1).  Third, reducing violence 
against women and girls is one of the policing areas considered to require a national strategy and a 
nationally coordinated operational response (Home Office, 2012). 
Acknowledging the need for a localized response, PCCs are expected to respond to the national 
agenda while also having the power to set local priorities and disburse funds to support these 
priorities, for example by funding alternatives to criminal justice approaches, supporting victims, and 
demanding action on the level and funding of specialized VAWG officers.  The guidance for PCCs 
from the Home Secretary states: “VAWG is not a problem that can be resolved with national action 
alone; it needs concerted, joined-up working at a local level”  (Home Office 2013b).  Both the main 
political parties also have national policy positions strongly supportive of the need to take action 
against VAWG.  Top down pressure for action to be taken on violence against women has been 
maintained through the publication of a critical national report by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary (2014) on police responses to domestic abuse. In short, a constant factor throughout 
the three years of our analysis was top down pressure for implementation of policies to address 
VAWG adopted at national level.  As well as this top down pressure, all PCC candidates were lobbied 
extensively in their localities by the Women’s Aid Federation of England on behalf of a national 
network of domestic and sexual violence services (Women’s Aid, 2012).    
However, at the local level, examining how PCCs have responded to the problem of violence against 
women and girls presents an empirical and analytical puzzle.  Our initial analysis of the policy 
priorities of the PCCs taken from their websites and manifesto statements at the time of their 
election shows that, despite pressure to address the problem of VAWG both from the National 
Home Secretary and from local campaigners, only six of the 41 Commissioners mention violence 
against women and girls and only six mention domestic violence as one of their priorities 
(Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, 2012a). Seeking to explain why policy prioritization 
varies across England and Wales, we examine the gendered dimensions of how these new actors are 
working with new institutional rules.  
Investigating Local Gender Equality Policy Reform 
Elsewhere we have argued for a clarification of the dimensions under scrutiny when seeking to 
explain gendered policy outcomes (Gains and Lowndes, 2014).  This article analyses the interaction 
of actors and institutions, and the effects of this interaction on outcomes.  We seek to specify and 
measure these different factors.  First, we look at rules about gender, which set out roles, actions or 
benefits that affect women and men differentially.  These rules about gender can be both positive, 
for example recent commitments in the UK political parties for gender balanced cabinet 
representation (Annesley and Gains, 2014).  Equally, rules about gender can be negative such as 
historic rules about the rights of married women to continue in employment, or penalties associated 
with pension entitlements.  Second, we consider the separate dimension of gendered actors working 
with rules.  Political actors design, enact and interpret institutional rules; moreover, they are 
inevitably gendered actors who reflect a range of intersectional identities.  It is important to analyze 
the relationship between gendered actors and institutional rules, some of which are specifically 
‘about gender’.  Thus scholars have examined the ‘politics of presence’ and the relationship that is 
often assumed between the descriptive and substantive representation of women (Phillips, 1995).  
Progress in gender equality policy is found to relate not only to the presence of women in 
legislatures and executives, but also to the role of individual male ‘critical actors’ (Childs and Krook, 
2009) and the collective contribution of networks of activists (Weldon, 2004).  In arguing for a ‘thick’ 
conception of the substantive representation of women, Fiona Mackay (2008, 135) argues that it is 
not possible to ‘fix’ in advance which category of actors, and which institutional arenas, are most 
significant.  Rather, the ‘critical actors, sites and dynamics’ can only be traced over time and within 
specific contexts.  In this spirit, we focus upon a generally neglected site – municipal governance – 
and investigate the role of one set of executive actors (PCCs) in contexts characterized by 
institutional legacies (from the previous police governance arrangements) and institutional 
interactions (with national policy frameworks, elected local authorities and local women’s 
movements).   
It is clear that gender can be considered as both a dependent and an independent variable - 
implicated in the outcomes we seek to explain and also the explanatory factors we are investigating.  
Hence, we need research strategies that are able to address questions of causation in a way that 
recognizes iterative relationships and issues of sequencing over time (as shown in Figure 1).  As 
Chappell and Mackay (2017) observe, more parsimonious models “often obscure rather than 
illuminate gender”, finding it difficult to capture the “’mesiness” of real work world scenarios.”  But 
seeking to clarify relationships between actors, rules and outcomes – within specific contexts - is 
necessary to build an understanding of complex processes of gendered institutional change.  It is 
also has important policy implications in terms of identifying points of intervention to support 
gender equality policy making. 
Figure 1 about here 
We use this framework to consider how gendered outcomes are linked to institutional rules about 
gender and to gendered actors who work with rules.  We ask how important these two sets of 
factors are in explaining variation in policy outcomes and set out our propositions below.  The 
analysis is restricted to a consideration of formal rules, which can be identified and assessed using 
quantitative measures.  [For an initial analysis of the role of informal rules in this case study, using 
qualitative research, see Gains and Lowndes (2016), and for a wider consideration of the role 
informal institutions play in gendering political behavior and outcome, see Waylen’s (2017) 
collection of essays.]   
 
Linking ‘Rules about Gender’ and Gendered Outcomes 
 
The most relevant ‘rules about gender’ for our case are those rules whose specific purpose is to 
promote gender equality, as embodied in the 2010 Equalities Act.  The legislation introduces 
‘equalities duties’ for all public officials which are designed to ‘mainstream’ policy making ensuring 
the consideration of gender differences (and other diversity issues) when looking at policy delivery 
and new policy proposals (Council of Europe, 1998; Verloo, 2005).   The UK’s equalities duties give all 
public sector bodies, including the new PCCs, an overarching duty to get rid of unlawful 
discrimination and harassment and to promote equal opportunities.  To fulfil this duty, the minimum 
requirement is for PCCs to make available data about equalities related to their office staffing (APPC, 
2012b).  PCCs must also explain to the Police and Crime Panel, which is charged with scrutinizing 
their work, how they are meeting these requirements, via their Annual Report (APCC, 2012b).  
 
However, the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners advises a more expansive engagement 
with the public sector equality duty, proposing that PCCs should oversee the delivery of the more 
demanding equalities duties with which police Chief Constables’are charged.  Responsible for 
operational policing, Chief Constables are required not just to publish staffing data, but also to 
publish equality objectives, and demonstrate that they have considered equalities implications in 
making decisions and formulating policies and practices.  The literature suggests that the ability of 
PCCs to fulfil equalities duties in this more expansive manner is likely to be linked to the policy 
capacity of their office.  The potential importance of such capacity in delivering gender equality is 
highlighted by McBride and Mazur (2010), who examine the role of women’s policy agencies in the 
provision of policy advice and research.  Women’s policy agencies can provide research capacity, 
organize internal lobbying efforts, provide costings and other operational information to assist with 
the passage of legislative and institutional change. At the national level, Annesley and Gains (2010) 
show how the the effectiveness of feminist ministers in the UK was increased over time by the 
establishment of a women’s policy agency and the employment of special equality advisers.  While 
PCCs inherited baseline staffing arrangements from the former police authorities (that supported 
the Police Committees), the new institutional arrangements allowed them to adapt these 
arrangements and/or employ staff with specific policy briefs. 
We anticipate that the prioritization of policies aimed at reducing VAWG is likely to be linked to 
variations in how each PCC responds to their equalities duties, specifically to whether a more 
expansive stance is adopted.   For example, if the PCC has employed an equalities adviser there will 
be a greater policy capacity to develop and promote measures to combat VAWG. And if a more 
expansive oversight of the Chief Constable’s specific equalities duties has also been undertaken and 
reported on (which may or may not rely on the PCC’s own policy capacity), we anticipate it is more 
likely that VAWGG will be a policy priority.  Our proposition therefore is that: 
• Where a full equalities assessment has been undertaken, and reported, PCCs are more likely 
to prioritize VAWG.   
 
Linking ‘Gendered Actors Working with Rules’ and Gendered Outcomes 
The link between improvements in the representation of women and policies for gender equality has 
been a central concern of the gender and politics literature (Lovenduski, 2005).  Drawing on Pitkin’s 
(1972) notion of substantive representation, recent scholarship has moved away from assuming an 
automatic link between increases in the descriptive representation of women (for example securing 
a ‘critical mass’ of women in legislatures) and policies to benefit women or gender equality.  The 
assumption that women will automatically ‘act for women’ is problematized, with an 
acknowledgement that not all women will take this route and that male actors can also advocate for 
policies aimed at women or to improve gender equality.  Recent literature focuses on the activities 
of ‘critical actors’ rather than assuming women will advocate for policy change (Childs and Krook, 
2009).  However, research findings consistently show improved outcomes for women where 
descriptive representation is improved, suggesting it is likely that at least some women political 
actors will seek to act for women either through pressurizing decision makers in executives or 
directly through legislative activity (Annesley et al, 2015).  For status based policies, like VAWG, we 
noted earlier the importance of female executive actors, as these actors can access power resources 
to achieve policy change, often in the face of doctrinal resistance.  The new Police and Crime 
Commissioners are able to claim political authority by being individually elected (albeit on a very 
small turnout), and they also control a sizeable budget and have the ability to set local priorities.  
The logic of the gender and representation literature leads us to a proposition that: 
• Female PCCs are more likely to make VAWG a policy priority. 
The literature on executive actors also suggests that there are several factors which can enhance the 
capacity of executive actors to achieve their goals, notably working with other actors who share 
their goals in a network of critical actors (Holli, 2008).  In the UK, research shows the importance of 
New Labour feminist ministers networking with other female cabinet ministers and advisers to 
achieve their policy goals (Annesley, 2010).  Examining the way in which local domestic violence 
policies were developed in three localities, Abrar (1996) draws attention to the importance of 
political support and also a strong local network of advocates, including support from women’s 
officers in local authorities and the ability to bid for funding.   
PCCs have two particularly close relationships in developing and achieving their policy priorities: with 
the Chief Constable for their locality, and with their Deputy PCC (whom they are empowered to 
appoint).  Given the evidence in the literature about the importance of the gender of key supporting 
actors, our next proposition states that:  
• Where actors in the close network of the PCC (like the Chief Constable or the Deputy PCC) are 
female, PCCs are more likely to make VAWG a policy priority.   
Data and Methods 
To examine these propositions we drew on publicly available information on the background, 
activities and decisions of the PCCs.  Data were recorded for each of the 41 PCCs in each of their first 
three years in office, using the measures explained below, which gave a total of 123 sets of 
observations.  Biographical information was available through a data set compiled by the Police 
Federation (http://www.polfed.org/fedatwork/police_and_crime_commissioners.aspx) which 
showed gender, party, employment background and any previous political or civic experience.  The 
‘Who’s my PCC’ website (sponsored by the Home Office) offered all 193 candidates, in each of the 
41 areas holding elections, the chance to post a short 200 word manifesto setting out their priorities 
(http://www.choosemypcc.org.uk,  accessed 25 January 2014).  Once elected, the 41 successful PCCs 
all hosted websites providing details of their office arrangements and staffing, their consultation 
arrangements, and (once published) access to their Police and Crime Plans and Annual Reports.  
Data on the local Chief Constable and the composition of the Police and Crime Panels in each area 
(in terms of staffing and appointments) were taken from the websites for each organization 
respectively.   
Our concern was to examine the relationship between the Commissioners as actors, the institutional 
rules which have emerged with the creation of the PCCs, and the gendered outcome of whether 
PCCs prioritized the issue of VAWG in their Police and Crime Plan.  Each PCC faces competing 
demands as to which issues to prioritize in their local plan, as well as how to respond given the 
resources available.  Prioritizing VAWG in the plan not only gives a political signal to the Chief 
Constable that this is an issue of concern, but is also likely to be associated with targeted funding for 
VAWG-related projects that offer support for victims or alternative treatments for offenders. i 
The first annual Police and Crime Plans were very varied in the way in which information was 
presented and, in order to develop a robust indicator, different measures of what constituted a 
strong focus on VAWG were needed. Some Commissioners had a specific section on VAWG and 
mentions of VAWG were restricted to this section; this meant that they often only had a small 
number of ‘mentions’, but a clear focus on VAWG. Others did not split the Plan into sections but 
mentioned VAWG a large number of times throughout the Plan. To capture these differences and 
identify this outcome, we create a binary variable by examining three separate measures.  First, for 
each locality we looked at whether VAWG was mentioned in each annual Plan; second, whether the 
number of mentions was above the average number of mentions; and third, whether there was a 
specific section on VAWG in the Plan (or one of the associated crimes covered under this heading, 
such as domestic violence).  This compound indicator led to a possible score of 0 – 3 and those PCC 
Plans which scored 2 or 3 were coded 1, whilst those with a score of  0 or 1 were coded 0 to create a 
variable ‘VAWG a priority focus’.  We found that, by this measure, 49% of the plans had a focus on 
VAWG as a priority (60 of the 123 observations). 
To identify the influence of ‘rules about gender’, we created another compound indictor that 
examined three separate measures to assess the extent to which PCCs exercised their equalities 
duties.  First, we noted (yes/no) whether each PCC mentioned their equalities duties in their plan. 
Second, we drew on information presented on PCC websites about their office staffing 
arrangements in order to identify whether the PCC employed an equalities adviser (or a dedicated 
domestic violence adviser) and therefore had a gender policy capacity. Finally, we examined 
whether the Annual Report commented on the incidence of VAWG in the locality, or the 
performance of the police in relation to VAWG.  Scoring of these measures allowed us to create a 
binary variable where PCCs scoring 2 or 3 were coded as ‘strongly’ meeting their equalities duties in 
that year and PCCs scoring 0 or 1 were coded as ‘weakly’ meeting their equalities duties.  According 
to this measure 45% provided full equalities reporting (55 of the 123 observations).   
The gender of all relevant actors, including PCCs themselves, was taken from the Police Federation 
and PCC websites mentioned above.  PCCs’ party affiliation, or independent status, was also taken 
from these sources. 
Research Findings 
In reporting our findings we note that our small N (123) means we are not seeking to identify 
statistical significance in our results; rather, we present descriptive statistics and report on the 
relative odds of support for our propositions.  We consider how we might further develop our 
analysis of these relationships in our conclusions. 
Rules about Gender 
Nearly two thirds of PCCs (62% or 76 of 123 observations) mentioned their specific responsibilities 
toward promoting gender equality under the Equalities Act in their plans.  However only 15% (19) of 
PCCs employed either an equality policy adviser (or an adviser on VAWG), which would provide a 
gender policy capacity. Just over a half (56% or 69 of the 123 observations) showed PCCs reporting in 
their Annual Reports on either incidence or performance in relation to VAWG.  We then scored 
whether the PCCs were performing their gender equality duties in either a strong or weak manner.  
We found that 45% of PCCs had a strong focus on their equalities duties.  We next examined 
whether the operation of these rules about gender was associated with the prioritization of VAWG 
in the PCC policy priorities (see Table 1). 
Table 1 about here 
Table 1 shows that, where PCCs had a weak gender equality focus, just over a third prioritized VAWG 
in their Plan; in contrast, nearly two thirds of the PCCs with a strong gender equality focus, had 
VAWG as a priority.  While our small N means we are not looking to establish the statistical 
significance of this relationship, we note that the odds of a PCC without a strong gender equality 
focus prioritizing VAWG is .66 whereas the odds of a PCC with a strong gender equality focus 
prioritizing VAWG is 1.5.  Therefore the relative odds are 2.3, meaning that where a PCC has a strong 
gender equality focus they are over twice as likely to prioritize VAWG.   
Gendered Actors Working with Rules 
Next we can examine whether there is a link between the gender of PCCs, and other actors in the 
PCCs’ elite network, and a focus on the gendered crimes associated with VAWG.  Here the highly 
gendered nature of policing is apparent.  Only 6 PCCs (14%) were female following the 2012 
elections, providing 18 observations (across the 3 years) of the priorities of a female PCC.ii  Where 
deputies were appointed only 24 of the 63 (38%) deputies are female; and 24 observations out of 
the 123 show the presence of a female Chief Constable (20%).  Despite the number of female PCCs 
being so small, it is possible to see a difference in how female PCCs prioritized VAWG in Table 2.  
Table 2 about here 
The findings in Table 2 show that the odds of female PCCs prioritizing a focus on VAWGG in their 
Police and Crime Plan was 1.6, compared with the odds of male PCCs prioritizing a focus on this area 
of .9.  The relative odds (female:male) are 1.8 suggesting that female PCCs were nearly twice as 
likely to make this issue as a priority.   
Next we examined whether having a female actor in the PCC elite network (comprising the PCC, the 
Deputy and the Chief Constable) might be linked to giving a priority focus to VAWG.  Nearly half 
(48%) of PCC areas had a female in one of these senior roles over the three year period.  However, 
demonstrating the highly gendered nature of the policing arena, only 6 of the 123 observations 
showed more than one female actor present at any one time within the elite network of the PCC, 
making it impossible to examine this proposition fully.   
 
Assessing the Relative Strength of Relationships  
Following on from the analysis of each of the institutional variables above, we used binary logistical 
analysis to examine the relative likelihood of a PCC having prioritized VAWG in relation to : the 
existence of a strong focus on equalities duties, and the gender of the PCC (Table 3 below).  We also 
included in this analysis whether the PCC was from an established party (rather than an 
independent).  We wanted to control for party effects because both main political parties (Labour 
and Conservative) had strong policy commitments at the national level regarding VAWG. 
Table 3 about here 
This analysis shows that, where gender equality duties are fully exploited, the PCC is 2.4 times as 
likely to prioritize gendered crime in the Plan (exemplified here by a focus on VAWG), all other 
factors being held constant.  Female Commissioners are twice as likely as their male counterparts to 
make VAWG a policy priority, even holding party affiliation and gender equality capacity constant. 
We also found that, holding all other variables constant, commissioners from established parties 
were just 1.2 times as likely as independent Commissioners (who have no such party discipline) to 
prioritize VAWG.  We also checked the strength of these associations whilst controlling for the 
VAWG conviction rate in each PCC area (to reflect the prevalence of relevant crimes).  However, 
including this control did not change the direction of the effect of the institutional associations we 
identified in our analysis.   
Conclusions 
This article argues that the understanding of how and when gender equality reform gets enacted is 
enhanced through an examination of actors and institutions at the municipal level.  In so doing we 
address a gap in the literature, which has tended to focus on the international and national level, 
with some work on states and provinces in federal systems.  Despite international norms and 
‘higher’ level policy frameworks, key decisions about gender equality reform are made at the local or 
municipal level.  Whether gender equality makes it on to crowded local policy agendas, which are 
shaped by local conditions and resource constraints, is important in explaining policy outcomes. We 
argue that this is particularly important when looking at status based policies (like VAWG), given that 
other research points to the role played by critical actors with executive powers in deciding whether 
or not to prioritize reforms.  Focusing on local level executive actors, we examine how and why local 
policy prioritization in favor of VAWG varies.  In explaining variation in outcomes, our analysis shows 
the importance of (a) the gender of executive actors, and (b) the way in which actors interpret ‘rules 
about gender’, regardless of their own gender.  
The findings are based on the analysis of the policy prioritization of VAWG among forty one police 
and crime commissioners in England and Wales over a three year period.  These findings 
demonstrate variability in the prioritization of VAWG policies at the local level, despite the uniform 
pressure for reform at the national level and local lobbying by civil society actors prior to their 
election.  We find that the likelihood of this prioritization is linked to actors’ own gender, with 
female PCCs being twice as likely to prioritize VAWG.  Prioritizing VAWG on local policy agendas is 
also linked to the ways in which PCCs engage with elements of the institutional framework, 
specifically institutional rules associated with gender equality duties.  Those PCCs who adopt a more 
expansive interpretation of their gender equality duties were 2.4 times more likely to prioritize 
VAWG in their annual policy plan.  We find that policy prioritization has a weaker association with 
other factors such as membership of political parties, with PCCs from established parties just 1.2 
times more likely than independent PCCs to make VAWG a policy priority.  
Our future research will complement the quantitative work presented in this article through 
qualitative work with a sample of PCC areas (building on Gains and Lowndes, 2016), which will allow 
us to investigate how the factors we have highlighted here play out in specific localities.  This will 
build a better understanding of how VAWG policy is influenced by PCCs’ own gender and their 
interpretation of the institutional rules that govern equalities duties.  Rather than using a simple 
male/female measure of PCCs’ gender, qualitative methods will enable research into more 
masculine or feminine styles of leadership, which may not map on to sex or socially ascribed gender 
(Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005).  Qualitative methods will also enable us to study the ways in 
which apparently gender-neutral institutional rules can also shape political behavior in gendered 
ways (e.g. conventions governing electoral campaigning or media presence).  Interviews, 
observations and ethnographies provide the most appropriate methods for investigating the role of 
informal institutional rules, which are note easily captured by quantitative indicators.  We know 
from the emerging literature that informal conventions serve in many instances to subvert or 
undermine formal rules about gender equality (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013; Lowndes, 2014; Waylen, 
2017).    As Chappell and Mackay (2017) argue: “Finding the right method to ‘see’ informal 
institutions is essential’.  This is the next challenge for our research. 
Recognizing the heterogeneity of gender equality policies, we have argued for an appreciation of 
how institutional arrangements at the local level may shape reform in the case of status policies, 
especially when this is the level at which key executive actors sit.  This focus on the local level is 
important for three reasons.  First, public policy involves institutional frameworks at multiple levels, 
which are nested together in different ways (‘higher’ levels may shape ‘lower’ levels to varying 
degrees, with bottom-up effects too).  Second, it is at the local level that individual actors interpret 
institutional rules, adapting them to fit ‘cases’ and contexts.  Third, this interpretive process is a key 
source of institutional change, which may operate to secure gender equality reform (through local 
adaptations or elaborations) or to undermine it (through the neglect or dilution of new rules). In 
short, a focus on the local level can extend and deepen our analysis of why gender equality reforms 
succeed or fail in gaining traction.  Such a focus can also inform policy to support gender equality 
reform, illuminating the importance of local level interventions not just in civil society but also within 
the institutions of governance and public administration.  While we recognize that different systems 
of local governance endow decision makers with varying levels of autonomy, our purpose is to draw 
attention to the potential significance of local actors and institutions in securing (or blocking) gender 
equality reforms.  Our findings in respect of police governance in England and Wales cannot be 
generalized to all settings in which status based gender equality reforms are locally shaped; 
however, they provide a reference point for further research in other jurisdictions (and on other 
status policies like women’s health or reproductive rights) by showing how theoretical propositions 
can be generated and how key variables can be operationalized and measured.   Testing whether our 
findings hold in other contexts will help build a fuller picture of the role of local actors and local 
institutions in framing gender equality policies. 
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Figure 1: Relationship Between Gendered Policy Stimuli, Actors, Rules and Outcomes   
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Table 1: Cross-tabulation of PCCs with a Strong Focus on Gender Equality Duties with 
PCCs giving VAWG Priority in Police and Crime Plan 
 
 
VAWG a priority Police and Crime Plan 
Total No Yes 
Strong focus on 
gender equality?  
No Count 41 27 68 
%  60.3% 39.7% 100.0% 
Yes Count 22 33 55 
%  40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 63 60 123 
%  51.2% 48.8% 100.0% 
 
 
Table 2: Cross-tabulation  of Gender of PCCs with PCCs giving VAWG priority in Police and 
Crime Plan 
 
 
VAWG a priority in Police and Crime Plan 
Total No Yes 
 Male PCCs 
Count 56 49 105 
%  53.3% 46.7% 100.0% 
Female PCCs 
Count 7 11 18 
%  38.9% 61.1% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 63 60 123 
%  51.2% 48.8% 100.0% 
 
 
 
Table 3: Factors associated with VAWG as a priority focus in Police and 
Crime Plan 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 
 
Strong gender equality focus .866 .375 5.324 1 .021 2.378 
Established party Candidate .202 .414 .238 1 .625 1.224 
Female PCC .709 .542 1.717 1 .190 2.033 
 
Constant 
-.683 .412 2.746 1 .097 .505 
 
Endnotes 
                                                          
i In order to control for our dependent variable (having a priority focus on VAWGG) being influenced by the 
level of VAWG in each PCC area, we created a control variable derived from Crown Prosecution Service 
statistics on the number of VAWG convictions (Crown Prosecution Service, 2013) per 1,000 population in each 
Police and Crime Commissioner area (Office of National Statistics, Dec 2013).   This showed that 17 (42%) PCC 
areas had a VAWG conviction rate below 1 per 1,000 population and 24 (59%) had a rate above 1 per 1,000 
population.  From this we created a binary variable of above 1/1,000 and below 1/1,000 and added this to the 
binary logistical regression model reported in findings below. 
ii The 2016 elections saw an increase in the number of female PCCs by just one, to seven. 
